Sustainable Development of International Organizations: Regulating AI Use within Internal law and Governance

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Abstract. The analysis and unification of the system of internal law of international organizations are one of the significant research areas regarding international law from the angle of AI use for the Good and Sustainable Development. In this context, the issue of the functioning of international organizations when using AI technologies in the internal management system becomes even more relevant. The purpose of the article is to determine the prospects for the development of the internal law of international organizations, taking into account the global implementation of AI technology. To achieve this goal, the role of the internal law of international organizations in the system of international law is determined in connection with the global development of AI, the current directions and prospects for regulating AI technology at the level of international organizations are identified. Academic publications and documents of international organizations are used as materials for the analysis. The methodology of the analysis is based on a qualitative approach and ground-theory, uses computer-based content analysis of the textual data. As a result of scientific, theoretical and empirical analysis, the authors determine the ways and offer recommendations for the safe implementation of technology to ensure a balanced use of AI, taking into account the specifics of the internal management of international organizations and employees.

1. INTRODUCTION

The Sustainable Development Goals, adopted by the United Nations in 2015, embody a comprehensive framework for governance strategies regarding national states and international organizations (Bernstein 2017). Nonetheless, as earlier as 2010, scholars noted the incorporation of sustainable development concept within the governance framework of the United Nations (Borne 2010). At the same time, the rapid advancement of artificial intelligence on a global scale has prompted discussions initiated and facilitated by the United Nations regarding strategies for AI use in a manner that serves humanity and addresses both national and international challenges (Governing AI for humanity 2024).

AI for Good and Sustainable Development is the leading concept regarding the AI applications across the world (Stahl et al. 2022). In July 2025, the respective summit has aimed to promote standards, and advance partnerships to solve global challenges 1 (Ai for Good n/d). Further on, regarding the global scale, the UN underlines that "AI stands out not only as a technological breakthrough but also as a powerful tool to accelerate progress across all 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)" (Artificial Intelligence and the Sustainable Development Goals: Operationalizing technology for a sustainable future n/d). With reference to this issue, the authors of the present paper consider the phenomenon of AI technology as the subject of analysis and assessment by international and regional organizations. Such a state of affairs at the UN level can be confirmed by the position of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk, who noted the need to develop AI regulation based on an assessment of the harm that people have experienced or may experience, the development of a system for regulating risks from the impact of AI systems, the development of existing legal systems taking into account the phenomenon of AI technology (data protection, competition law and industry rules, including healthcare, technology or financial markets), the inadmissibility of self-regulation of the AI industry (Volker 2023). Further on, regarding the level of international organizations, it is relevant to note the current Recommendation on the Ethics of Artificial Intelligence under the auspices of UNESCO (SHS/BIO/PI/2021/1 2021), which contains the basic principles of ethical regulation of this technology, areas of regulation related to data protection, human rights, education and research, etc. In addition, one cannot fail to mention the Recommendation of the Council on Artificial Intelligence prepared by the OECD (OECD/LEGAL/0449), which contains similar principles of responsible management of reliable AI and the development of national policies by OECD member countries and the establishment of international cooperation to create reliable AI.

Regarding the regional intergovernmental initiatives, it is relevant to mention the legislative initiatives that are in force or under the consideration regarding the regulation of AI technology. Within the European Union, the EU Law on Artificial Intelligence is in force, which lays the foundations for regulating AI in the EU, defines the subject composition, sanctions for violating the provisions of this law, as well as a basic risk-oriented approach to the procedure for using AI (The EU AI Act). At the level of the CIS countries, separate legislation is being developed detailing the procedure for regulating relations related to the use of AI technology, including industry specifics of the use of AI (i. e. the military sphere), the procedure for working with personal data, recording the general principles of regulating AI, etc. (CIS 2024, Ablomeiko et al 2024).

The AI phenomenon is also the subject of initiatives by heads of state. Thus, the Chairman of the People's Republic of China Xi Jinping has called for strengthening international governance and cooperation in the field of artificial intelligence to ensure that AI serves the benefit of all, and is not a game for rich countries and people (Reuters 2024). US President Donald Trump actively supports the $ 500 billion Stargate project to expand the AI infrastructure in the United States, which is one of the largest infrastructure projects in the world (Garth Friesen 2025). Russian President Vladimir Putin, in his speech at a conference dedicated to AI technology, has underlined that Russia should become a world leader not only in the creation, but also in the scale of application, the penetration of artificial intelligence into all spheres of our lives without exception. In the global framework of international cooperation, it seems important to mention the interaction with the countries of the Global South and East through consultations and technical assistance, as well as to keep in mind the BRICS countries collaboration on the platform of the

international Alliance of national associations and development institutions in the field of artificial intelligence (Kremlin 2024).

The above-mentioned trends determine the relevance of the issue of using AI within the framework of the internal law of international organizations (Hurd 2024). The academic community is actively exploring the state and prospects for the development of AI for the purposes of developing international law and international organizations. Recently, works by scientists have been published with the aim to provide a comprehensive study of the AI phenomenon and the transformation of existing sub-branches of international law (Lee 2022, Tzimas 2021). Modern studies formulate general issues of transforming humanitarian law in view of the introduction of AI technology into the military sphere (Ojha 2025, Garcia 2018), the allocation of separate legal personality (Kobalia & Hanetova 2024), the transformation of international institutions (Maas 2019), while taking into account the experiences identified at the national levels (Martin-Bariteau & Scassa 2021). However, scholars acknowledge the lack of due coordination by a multilateral institutional framework, against a world-wide trend to AI global governance (Cole 2024). Moreover, there is a debate over the use of "internal law" instead of "rules of the organization" (Lemos 2014). In general, to date, the role and place of internal law in the UN system remains a debatable issue, the AI phenomenon is not systematically considered from this perspective (Dexue 2024).

Meanwhile, the increasing use of AI inside the international organizations under the Un umbrella highlights the increasing necessity to establish the regulations that govern areas and procedures of the organization's engagement with these technologies, as recent research indicates (Fournier-Tombs, 2021). However, despite this recognition of the implications of AI usage within the context of the Internal regulations of the UN, there has yet to be a systemic exploration of these issues.

Give the above background the present research aims to determine the prospects for the development of the internal law of international organizations taking into account the global implementation of AI technology for the Good and Sustainable Development.

To achieve this goal, it is necessary to solve the following tasks:

1)   to specify the role of internal law of international organizations in the international law framework for AI global development;
2)   to analyze current trends and prospects for regulating AI technology within the international organizations;
3)   to formulate recommendations and suggest solutions based on the analysis.

2. MATERIALS AND METHODS

The materials have aggregated the documents of international and regional organizations whose activities are implemented within the field of the study, and academic research on the featured topic, as well.

The research methodology has rested on the qualitative approach that allows researchers to aggregate the empirical data from the ground for further interpretations (Andreassen, O'Brien, & Sano 2024; Glaser, Strauss 1967). The study has also integrated a complex of modern philosophical, cognitive, comparative, and interpreting methods. In terms of the empirical part, computer-based content thematic analysis of the documents and academic publications was implemented.

The collection of the data included several steps and tracks. First, the search of legal documents related to the UN activities was implemented. The procedure resulted in the consistent volume of documents with reference to the UN bodies. The documents were identified on the official sites of the organizations under the UN umbrella. Over 100 documents were subject to an initial analysis and interpretation within the framework of the present research.

Second, the documents of the European Union were taken into account to compare and evaluate the perspective of the AI development at international level bearing in mind regional organizations' practice. Such an approach has been used by contemporary academics who specialize in international law (Hervey et al. 2024, Cole 2024). Over 20 acts and regulations were subject to the consideration.

Third, academic publications were subject to search, under the condition of the reference to the UN. The Google database was used for the search of the publications on the issue under study. The search in English included the key words UN organizations internal law and AI within UN internal law with the period of 2022-2025 (as the period of AI active implementation in socio-legal framework of the world community) resulted in 23 900 items identified in 0,18 second. However, after the exclusion of the papers related to the legal issues of internal conflicts and the selection of the most cited authors (h=10+) only 520 led to sources related to UN internal law were left. Further exclusion due to the theme repetition resulted in 136 academic publications.

The above-mentioned groups of the texts were organized as three respective corpuses. Each one was subject to the thematic analysis through the QDA Miner Lite (QDA n/d). The data processing led to the identification of the emergent codes that identified major thematic clusters mentioned and coordinated across three corpuses that are described in the section of Results.

3. RESULTS

The analysis of academic publications on the status of the internal law of international organizations in the system of international law in connection with the global development of AI as of July 2025 allowed the authors to identify the following clusters related to the concept of the internal law regarding the international organizations under the UN umbrella:

•   Norms for the formation of the structure, functions of bodies, as well as their competence;
•   Documents for the functioning of the structure of the organization and its bodies, practice;
•   Associated with the internal life of the organization.

The above themes reached 75% and higher of the frequency mentions across the academic publications and were found in the clusters characterizing the themes related to AI regulations with reference to UN Internal Law.

The details regarding the theme / word frequency in the respective clusters are specified in Figure 1. However, the authors underline that that the data specifies the mainstream and concrete percentage might vary due to the selection of additional textual sources.

Table 1. Academic publications (2022-2025) on the role of internal law of international organizations within international law framework for AI global development.

	Internal Law of the UN Organizations: Thematic Codes in Academic Publications		
Theme/Word Frequency (%) in the Cluster	norms for the formation of the structure, functions of bodies, as well as their competence	documents for the functioning of the structure of the organization and its bodies, practice	associated with the internal life of the organization
	85%	78%	75%
	lawmaking differs from lawmaking in the form of decisions binding on states not identical to international law		
	89%		

The analysis of documents that refer to the status of the internal law of international organizations in the system of international law in connection with the global development of AI as of July 2025 allowed the authors to identify the following clusters related to the concept of the internal law regarding the international organizations under the UN umbrella:

- Legal liability for AI technology use in activities of international organizations
- Regulation of AI technology use in the personal data processing within international organizations
- Implementation of the rights of international employees in the context of AI development from the standpoint of human rights

The above themes reached 75% and higher of the frequency mentions across the official documents and shaped the core clusters characterizing the themes related to AI regulations with reference to UN Internal Law.

The details regarding the theme / word frequency in the respective clusters are specified in Figure 2. However, the authors underline that that the data specifies the mainstream and concrete percentage might vary due to the selection of additional and/or new adopted documents.

Table 2. Current trends and prospects for regulating AI technology at the level of international organizations.

	AI Regulation with Reference to UN Internal Law		
Theme/Word Frequency (%) in the Cluster	Legal liability for AI technology use in activities of international organizations	Regulation of AI technology use in the personal data processing within international organizations	Implementation of the rights of international employees in the context of AI development from the standpoint of human rights
	89%	82%	75%

The above-mentioned topics are further considered and interpreted on grounds of academic publications, UN documents and EU sources and practice (if required for the purpose of comparison and details).

4. DISCUSSISON

4.1. Role of Internal Law of International Organizations Within International Law Framework for AI Global Development

When exploring the role of internal law of international organizations in the international law governing AI global development, the authors deem it academically prudent to delineate the contours of the definition of internal law from the both doctrinal and law implementation perspectives.

As far as the Russian legal trend is concerned, Morozov (1992) notes that the internal law of international organizations is the norms that form the structure, functions of bodies, as well as their competence. Issues that determine labor, property (including financial) and other legal relations related to the actions of the personnel of the international organization are separately recorded. Additionally, a block of issues related to the procedural aspect that ensures the effective functioning of the international organization is highlighted (Morozov 1992). This thesis was previously articulated by Krivchikova (1979), who provided a definition of the norms regulating the activities of international organizations in the process of international lawmaking in the law of international organizations (Krivchikova 1979).

The content of internal law as a set of norms is the focus of the research by Shibaeva (1986), who has specified that the content of internal law of international organizations is a set of norms that are adopted by the bodies of the organization itself on issues related to the internal life of the organization, the source of which are decisions of a mandatory nature (Shibaeva 1986). Additionally, the above author notes that the internal law of international organizations includes, as a legal institution, a set of norms regulating issues of international administrative jurisdiction, which refers to the activities of administrative tribunals of the ILO and the UN.

A number of researchers pay special attention within the concept of internal law to acts, decisions, resolutions of the organization and law enforcement practice based on them. Thus, Bowett (1963) refers constituent acts, decisions and resolutions adopted in accordance with them, as well as the established practice of the organization, to the internal law of an international organization, or the rules of the organization (Bowett 1963).

Cahier (1988) believes that the sources of internal law are the charter, resolutions of bodies, and customs that develop in the course of the organization's activities. He identifies two categories of resolutions concerning the internal functioning of the organization. Firstly, these are decisions taken by one body in relation to another. Secondly, these are resolutions that bodies create and approve general rules necessary for the functioning of the organization (Cahier 1988).

Castaneda and Bindschedler (1970), while examining the internal law of international organizations in a narrow sense, assert

that on the basis of their charter, international organizations develop in the form of treaties or customs a large number of legal norms concerning their structure and functions. These norms are contained in resolutions on internal issues, which are of a special legal nature, create new bodies and regulate the activities of member states and secretariats. In their opinion, this is precisely what underlies the binding nature of such acts (Castañeda 1970).

It should be noted that at present, the concept of implied competence of international organizations in the area of their internal functioning is widely recognized in international legal literature following initial steps of the past century (Vignes 1983).

In the 20th century Detter (1965), drawing a parallel with the internal law of many states, pointed out that any entity, in accordance with the principle of self-organization, can adopt its own rules of procedure that ensure its successful functioning, regardless of whether it was directly authorized to do so (Detter 1965).

Forty years later Alvarez (2006) notes that "external" lawmaking in the form of decisions binding on states differs in practice from "internal" lawmaking. Internal rules aimed at ensuring the activities of the organization itself include rules governing the international legal personality of the organization, the conditions for the functioning of the secretariat, the privileges, immunities of the organization, its agents and representatives to it, as well as procedural rules necessary for the organization to carry out the functions assigned to it (Alvarez 2006).

A similar tradition that has been fostering in the course of nearly 40 years and can be found in the works of researchers from different national law schools. Thus, Vignes (1983) emphasizes the importance of "internal" lawmaking, pointing out that initially the expansion of the legal capacity of organizations was associated precisely with the sphere of their internal life (Vignes 1983).

In a similar perspective, Bekyashev (2019) in his research focuses on labor relations and notes that labor relations entered into by citizens of different countries with an employer in the person of an international organization provide the former with the status of international employees. This situation falls under the jurisdiction of the international organization in everything that concerns their work. Thus, the activities of an international employee are not regulated by national legislation (Bekyashev 2019).

Morawiecki (1976) underlined that many norms of internal law are of an international legal nature. For example, in his opinion, these are the rules of procedure of intergovernmental bodies, since they directly regulate relations between states as members of these bodies. He applies the same principle to decisions regarding the creation of subsidiary bodies, since, in essence, they regulate not so much the relations between the main and subsidiary bodies, but the relations between the member states represented in these bodies. At the same time, he points out that some norms of the internal law of the organization do not relate to the norms of international law. First of all, this concerns the rules on personnel, as well as a number of others, since they regulate relations between the organization and individuals. He writes that these relations do not belong to the internal law of any state, they belong to the law of the international organization, which in these cases is not identical to international law (Morawiecki 1976).

It should be noted that the norms of internal law are endowed with mandatory force, which is necessary for regulating relations within organizations. The mandatory force of such norms is evidenced, in particular, by the possibility of applying sanctions in the event of their violation, provided for by constituent acts (Lukashuk 1997).

Considering the historical aspect, it is impossible not to mention the practice of international public law. Within the framework of this practice, the concept of internal law was first used in the decision of the Administrative Tribunal of the League of Nations "the internal law of the League of Nations" (1929) (League of Nations Administrative Tribunal).

The case it concerns referred to the wrongful exclusion of the plaintiff from the League of Nations Provident Fund. The text of the judgment specifically notes that the Tribunal must apply the internal law of the League of Nations, whether set out in general provisions or in decisions and texts governing specific cases, as well as the contractual provisions agreed upon between the Administration and its officials.

From the current case law, it is necessary to refer to the case of Tanifum v. Secretary-General of the United Nations (UNDT/2020/179). Under paragraph 29, the UN Dispute Tribunal noted that the United Nations is guided by its internal rules and regulations and not by the rules of any other organization, unless it recognizes such rules as part of its internal law.

It is also necessary to note the practice of the Court of the Eurasian Economic Union, which, in its conclusions, determines that "the internal law of an international organization in terms of regulating relations on issues of international civil service is aimed at eliminating the influence of national law on an employee, as a result of which the independence of the relevant employee in making decisions is ensured" (Court of the Eurasian Economic Union. 2016),Court of the Eurasian Economic Union 2017).

The authors of this article share the position of those scientists who, through their research, confirm the absence of any unification of the legal procedure for applying the internal law of international organizations (Bekyashev et al. 2022) and accept for the doctrinal basis the concept of professor Abashidze (2020) who, together with his colleagues, determines that the internal competence of international organizations is expressed through the powers and practical activities of the bodies of the international organization, which are aimed at solving internal issues of the organization's functioning (for example, the creation of subsidiary bodies, solving financial, technical, administrative and other issues) (Abashidze et al. 2020). This approach to defining the internal law of international organizations allows the authors to consider the lawmaking of international organizations as their legislative activity, a set of documents being developed as sources of the internal law of organizations, their law implementation practice based on the adopted documents. This approach allows the authors of this study to explore the prospects for the application of artificial intelligence technology within the framework of the internal law of international organizations by analyzing internal documents of the UN (and a number of EU documents for the purposes of comparative and predictive analysis) in order to determine the areas for the implementation of AI within the framework of the internal law of international organizations and the main directions for this process regulation.

4.2. Current Trends and Prospects for Regulating AI Technology Within International Organizations

The results of the analysis of the regulatory framework of organizations in the UN system, current recommendations and ethical requirements for the use of AI at the level of international organizations (OECD (OECD/LEGAL/0449, 2020), UNESCO (UNESCO 2020), World Bank (World Bank n/d), ICC (ICRC 2021), AI Committee (EU) (CAHAI 2020), as well as the active implementation of AI strategies at the level of national states have made it possible to identify the following current areas of regulation of AI technology at the level of international organizations as of July 2025.

- Legal liability for AI technology use in activities of international organizations
- Regulation of AI technology use in the personal data processing within international organizations
- Implementation of the rights of international employees in the context of AI development from the standpoint of human rights

The following subsections introduce the analysis of the above areas. As an example of the implementation of the rights of international employees in the context of AI development from the standpoint of human rights, this article examines the right to health, taking into account the materials on this topic identified during the empirical analysis.

4.2.1. Legal Liability for AI Technology Use in Activities of International Organizations

When considering the concept of legal responsibility of international organizations for the use of AI technologies in their activities, one cannot help but mention the fundamental Vienna Convention, which defines the term "rules of the organization" to refer to the so-called "internal law of the organization," which is classically used in scholarship to recognize that international organizations have their own legal orders (UN 1968). In this sense, Article 6 of the 1986 Vienna Convention refers to the "rules of the organization," recognizing that international organizations have the right to conclude treaties autonomously from their member states. This autonomy, manifested in its separate will, is therefore a necessary precondition for international organizations to exist as separate legal entities in international law.

While addressing the issues of determining responsibility for the internal law of the UN, the authors propose to return to the consideration of the previously mentioned document "Framework for a Model Policy on the Responsible Use of Artificial Intelligence in UN System Organizations".

This document establishes that the risk owner (legal entity or official) is required to coordinate with the relevant data and application owners to identify specific risks and measures to mitigate them.

At the same time, roles, responsibilities and communication methods related to mapping, measuring and managing AI risks should be documented and understood by individuals and teams across the organization.

The document, from the standpoint of defining responsibility, also suggests differentiating positions related to control and development, i.e. specialists performing testing and evaluation tasks should be independent from the developers of AI systems and report to risk management functions or directly to senior management.

As part of their responsibilities, AI risk owners are required to provide regular training and updates to internal policies to stay abreast of the latest developments in AI and risk management practices.

For the purposes of determining accountability, the following relevant provisions are also specified:

- Records of the AI model development process, including data sources, data pre-processing steps, model selection, training procedures;
- Mechanisms for tracking and explaining decisions made using AI;
- Approved standards for the development and deployment of AI,
- Conducting systematic compliance reviews and technical audits of the development and operation of AI systems to ensure compliance with established AI policies.

The document also provides for a specialized complaints procedure related to AI used by a UN organization. UN organizations shall establish or adapt mechanisms through which individuals or organizations can file complaints if they identify instances where the use of AI does not comply with the organization's established AI policy or has had an adverse impact on human rights. At the same time, the previously discussed UN organization's data protection and privacy policy provides for the possibility of automated decision-making. In this context, the document requires the establishment of a transparent and accessible, as well as, to the extent possible, independent and impartial reporting system for handling complaints and investigating cases of non-compliance. Such a system should be linked to existing whistleblower protection policies and procedures.

At the same time, UN organizations should include in their complaint procedures a mechanism for immediate action in cases of imminent threat or serious impact on personnel or stakeholders. The remedies for the complainant include partial or full suspension of the AI's decisions.

In the context of the responsibilities of employees of international organizations, it is impossible not to recall the previously discussed "Staff Regulations and Rules of the United Nations, including the Provisional Staff Rules of the United Nations", where, within the framework of regulations 1.3, as well as rules 1.5, 1.7, 1.8, the following obligations of employees are established:

- Regulation 1.3 - Staff members shall be responsible to the Secretary-General for the proper performance of their functions. They shall maintain the highest standards of efficiency, competence and integrity in the performance of their functions. Their performance will be periodically assessed to ensure that established standards of performance are met.
- Rule 1.5 - Staff members, when applying for and subsequently being appointed to a post, shall submit to the Secretary-General all relevant information that may be required for the purpose of determining their status under the requirements of this document, as well as for the purpose of completing the administrative procedures relating to their appointment. Staff members shall be personally responsible for the accuracy and completeness of the information they submit.
- Rule 1.7 - Employees shall exercise reasonable care in all matters affecting the financial interests of the Organization, its physical and human resources, property and assets.
- Rule 1.8 - Employees who own or drive motor vehicles shall be insured against civil liability and against damage to property in an amount sufficient to insure them against claims for personal injury or death to others or for damage to the property of others caused by the employees' motor vehicles.

Within the framework of rule 1.8, the authors of the present research note that the issue of the use and operation of unmanned vehicles remains open, as do the issues of determining liability for possible road accidents.

Regarding the academic discussion of the general questions of determining responsibility, C. Ahlborn in his study (Ahlborn 2011) of the draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations (DARIO) (GA 2009) and the Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ASR) (ILC 2021) notes that the content of international responsibility, DARIO, as well as ASR, establish that international organizations are obliged to compensate for damage as a legal consequence of their wrongful conduct in accordance with Article 30 of DARIO.

Further on, Solntsev. and Klyunya (2013) note that an international organization responsible for an internationally wrongful act is obliged to provide full compensation for damage to the injured subjects of international law, which includes any damage, both material and moral. According to the above authors, an international organization has no right to refer to internal rules to justify failure to fulfill its obligations, which, however, does not affect the applicability of the rules of an international organization to its member states or organizations that are its members (Solntsev & Klyunya 2013).

At the same time, these provisions are debatable in the context of illegal activities carried out using AI technology by an international organization, its employees, especially in the context of the internal law of international organizations.

For instance, Zamyatin (2005) expresses an alternative point of view, drawing attention to the fact that when qualifying an act committed by an international organization, "there is no division into the internal law of the given organization and general international law," since when developing provisions on the responsibility of international organizations, the UN International Law Commission decided that this division was inappropriate, since the internal law of the organization must be incorporated into general international law (Zamyatin 2005).

Armin von Bogdandy and Mateja Steinbrück Platise (2012) note in their study that international organizations can be considered international public bodies, since their actions increasingly affect the rights of individuals and legal entities. However, the Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations (ARIO) (ILC 2011) bring some progress in this regard, but still leave victims of human rights violations largely unattended (von Bogdandy & Steinbrück Platise 2012).

In general, it should be noted that the scientific community is actively interested in issues of determining the responsibility of international organizations and issues of judicial practice through the prism of the above documents (Richard 2013; Nedeski & Nollkaemper 2012; Möldner 2012).

However, it seems relevant to take into account the position of Gaja (2014) who notes that the practice regarding the responsibility of international organizations is rather meager. Among the key reasons for the extremely limited number of cases are the short duration of the functioning of international organizations, as well as their right to refrain from submitting their disputes to arbitration, and at the level of national legislation these organizations have immunity (Gaja 2014).

The field of questions regarding further qualification at the level of officials of international organizations and questions regarding the place of AI technology in this system of legal relations remains open.

In the context of AI technology, it is necessary to note the practice already emerging at the level of international courts of the inadmissibility of the use of AI algorithms that violate basic human rights.

The authors draw attention to the decision of the District Court of The Hague, which issued a decision in the case of NCJM et al. and FNV v. the State of the Netherlands (SyRI) (District Court of the Hague 2020).

In this case, the plaintiffs challenged the Dutch government's misuse of System Risk Indication (SyRI).

This algorithm autonomously identified situations of potential fraud in the field of social security. In this case, the court ruled that the use of this AI (SyRI) did not meet the requirements set out in Article 8(2) of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR, 1950) (the interference with the right to privacy was necessary and proportionate). The basis for this decision was that the algorithm was not transparent, the legal nature of this technology was not fully disclosed, which makes it impossible to clearly determine the absence or presence of bias embedded in the algorithms.

It should be noted that the plaintiffs did not rely on a number of legal requirements in their claim, namely Article 14 ECHR, which could be interpreted as unjustifiably restricting people's access to social benefits to which they are entitled.

The general practice of determining liability for harm caused by AI is currently not enshrined in a specialized document, since there is no unified concept of tort liability in the sources of international law. The general practice will be reduced to applying existing torts by analogy, such as causing harm by a source of increased danger or due to product defects (European Commission 1985, European Commission, 2017). At the same time, these acts can only be applied to narrow AI technologies, but do not take into account the autonomous nature of general and super AI.

The issues of regulating AI and robotics have a rather controversial history, starting with the publication of a document by the European Parliament together with the recommendations of the Commission on civil law regulation in the field of robotics of the European Parliament of 16.02.2017 "Norms of civil law on robotics", where in subparagraph "f" of paragraph 59 of the Resolution the need to create a special legal status ("electronic persons") for robots in the long term was emphasized.

This thesis opened an extensive discussion about defining the boundaries of the subjectivity of robotics, including with elements of AI, highlighting both a group of supporters of the allocation of separate legal personality of AI, and opponents.

Opponents of the theory of AI legal personality note that the absence of cognitive and moral features of the human condition will not allow AI to effectively possess the prerogatives and obligations associated with the status of a legal entity (Solaiman 2017; Gordon 2020; Chesterman 2020), the inadmissibility of applying the legal status of AI from the model of an individual, since in this case it provides the technology with the right to dignity, inviolability, etc. (Turner 2018). In the context of determining liability, one cannot fail to note the danger of human parties escaping responsibility, the lack of incentive to improve technologies and the difficulties with identifying AI in the context of establishing the offender at the entire stage of the technology's life cycle (Dahiyat 2021; Bryson 2017).

In the context of the possible implementation of the legal capacity of AI, it is necessary to note the possible development of partial legal capacity for AI systems as legal entities, since this corresponds to their supposed function of "complex servants" (Schirmer 2020), the formation of AI as a legal entity through the introduction of financial contributions from all human parties to the assets of AI, in the form of compulsory insurance or a compensation fund, thereby reproducing the system without guilt (Ziemianin 2021). Some scientists note the possibility of reasonably considering an electronic person as another legal fiction in the form of some organizational structure with artificial intelligence, with the subsequent possibility of developing definitions of "electronic legal entity", "electronic government agency", "electronic executive authority", "electronic official" (Yastrebov & Aksenova 2022).

Subsequently, the European Commission, in its proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down harmonized rules on artificial intelligence and amending certain Union legislation, decided not to grant it the status of electronic person (European Commission 2021).

The authors of the present article consider, that the allocation of the legal fiction of an electronic person, by analogy with a legal entity, can be promising only in the case of the complete development and definition of legal structures of all participants exploiting AI, at the stage of formation and development of technology from the level of narrow AI to the level of general AI (Atabekov 2023).

In the context of the current regulation of AI technology in the territory of EU member states, the fundamental document is the EU AI Act (EU 2024). This act is noteworthy both from the point of view of creating basic approaches to regulating AI based on determining the public danger of this technology, and the development of basic parameters for determining liability (Chapter 12). Within the framework of the presented chapter, the articles contain the basic conditions for determining illegal actions, the subject composition, as well as the qualification of actions (as an aggravating element) for establishing a turnover or fixed fine, which is imposed on the subject who violated this law.

Scientists note the need to improve this initiative, since it does not fully take into account the qualification parameters of bias (Wachter 2024), issues of processing data with "toxic" content and hybrid threats (Hacker 2023), the controversial nature of the quantitative and qualitative harm from AI technology (Kusche 2024), and other issues (Almada & Petit 2025).

The authors of the present study note that this initiative is a starting point for the formation of comprehensive regulation of AI both in international law itself and in matters of regulating AI for the purposes of the domestic law of international organizations.

4.2.2. Regulation of AI Technology Use in the Personal Data Processing within International Organizations

A separate set of issues, which is at the direct intersection between AI technologies and the activities of international organizations, concerns the procedure for processing personal data.

While considering the UN practice in the area of internal law of this organization in the area of ensuring confidentiality and working with personal data, the authors turn to the Data Protection and Privacy Policy for the United Nations Secretariat (UN 2024).

This document contains a large number of rules and conditions that ensure the lawful use of information for official purposes. In the context of the role and place of AI technology, we will refer to a number of provisions of this document:

- provision 2.10 - Automated decision-making, contains a description of the process of making decisions by processing data by automated means without verification or intervention by an individual;
- provision 11.2 requires the data controller to conduct an impact assessment of the data processing in order to identify and assess the potential risks, harm and benefits associated with the processing of such data, as well as appropriate measures to prevent or mitigate any identified risks or harm, including when using automated decision-making systems, as well as when artificial intelligence, blockchain or other similar new technologies are supposed to be used for data processing;
- provision 13.1. provides that, unless there is a conflict with the purposes of the processing or the data controller's obligations to maintain confidentiality, and unless the data subjects already have the relevant information, data controllers must provide data subjects with general information about: whether the processing involves automated decision-making that may result in a decision significantly affecting the data subjects;
- provision 17.4 provides for the right of natural persons who are data subjects to request, in relation to a specific case of processing of personal data relating to them, information about whether the processing involves automated decision-making that may result in a decision significantly affecting them.

It should be noted that within the framework of this document, automated decision-making systems are not included in the same plane of interpretation as AI technology (within the framework of this document there is only the definition presented above in provision 2.10), which requires a more detailed definition for AI at the level of internal documents and, in general, the development of separate regulatory documents.

Considering one of the aspects of AI application, we cannot but mention the difficulties associated with AI bias and potential discrimination (Nwafor 2021). Considering in this construction the fundamental documents of the UN having both internal and external legal properties, we propose to dwell on the documents that are comprehensively developed by the United Nations Chief Executives Board.

For the purposes of UN internal law, it seems necessary to consider a number of documents.

First, there is the "Principles for the Ethical Use of Artificial Intelligence in the United Nations System (UN 2022)." This document contains fundamental principles that UN organizations should follow when developing, deploying, operating, etc. AI systems.

Section 2 provides definitions of these principles, which include the principle of "do no harm", the use of AI should be proportionate and equitable to the intended purpose, ensuring data protection, fairness and non-discrimination, ensuring human autonomy and oversight of AI technology, etc.

The second document, namely "PRINCIPLES OF PERSONAL DATA PROTECTION AND PRIVACY", bears a strategic importance for defining the principles of data processing by AI technology (HLCM 2018). Within the framework of this document, such principles as fair and lawful data processing (defining the best conditions for their processing for participants), specification (it is necessary to maintain a balance between the relevant rights, freedoms and interests), proportionality and necessity (processing must be relevant, limited and adequate to what is necessary in connection with the specified purposes of personal data processing), safety, security, confidentiality, transparency, etc. are set forth and specified.

The next document is the "Report on the Operational Use of AI in the UN System". This report is interesting from the point of view of practical examples of the use of AI in the activities of UN organizations (HLCM 2024). In the context of legal regulation of the conditions for the use of AI, this report aggregates the following tasks developed on the basis of practical cases related to AI in practical international activities:

- Development of guidelines for the responsible use of third-party models and datasets for the activities of organizations included in the UN system;
- Development of guidelines for the responsible development of proprietary models and datasets for the activities of organizations included in the UN system, including comprehensive privacy and data protection testing, as well as the deployment and testing of AI models;
- Promotion of new technology templates that are independent of the data provider for AI and can be transformed into reference structures; it should be noted that this principle is subsequently actively promoted in other points, in order to minimize binding to a data provider or centralized data warehouses in favor of decentralized development and operation of AI; while emphasizing compliance with confidentiality, impartiality, etc.

It is also necessary to take into account the document under the title "Framework for a Model Policy on the Responsible Use of Artificial Intelligence in UN System Organizations". This document contains unified technical and legal requirements for developers and operators of AI (CEB 2024). Within the framework of the presented document, it is necessary to note a number of key requirements for UN system organizations.

First of all, it sets out the creation of an AI accountability framework that will facilitate the implementation of AI policies and will be consistent with or embed these structures into existing accountability mechanisms in their organization. Within this requirement, it further defines agents (officials) whose functions should take into account, among other things, the following tasks:

- Overseeing the implementation of the organization's AI policy and its compliance with relevant international policy frameworks and interagency cooperation;
- Monitoring changes in the AI regulatory framework, including changes related to local jurisdiction, that may have an impact on the organization (within and beyond the scope of privileges and immunities);
- Regulating the terms of use, especially by external parties, of any data or services that are based on AI;

- Monitoring the compliance of AI initiatives with human rights (human rights due diligence) and data protection and privacy policies;
- Defining and implementing measures to cover the necessary shutdown of AI;
- Developing tools to regulate the use of data for AI purposes, as well as the use of AI directly at organizational boundaries, such as regulating whether government data is within fair use, restricted, or open for loading into AI models. In addition, how to ensure the continuity of society/business in the event of AI degradation.

In addition, the document under consideration emphasizes the need for an organization to develop an AI impact assessment tool, which should include a risk assessment tool. In this context, a risk profiling framework similar to the EU AI act is presented:

- Very high risk - the head of the organization is required to implement specific measures to remediate or monitor the technology; if the risks cannot be adequately mitigated, the use of the system may be prohibited;
- High risk - the organization must implement specific measures to remediate or monitor the operation of the AI system, including consultation and agreement with accountability mechanisms that facilitate the implementation of the organization's AI policy; it is separately recommended to monitor the breadth of use of the AI system and monitor the target audience directly or indirectly affected by this technology
- Medium risk - the organization must implement specific measures to remediate or monitor, data protection requirements also apply;
- low risk - there are no specific obligations beyond existing institutional safeguards.

In the context of regulation of the procedure for handling information in the EU countries, it should be noted that the issues of personal data circulation are regulated by the provisions of the Council of Europe Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data of 28.01.1981, EU Regulation No. 2016/679 of 27.04.2016 "On the Protection of Individuals with regard to the Processing of Personal Data...", which obliges operators to take additional organizational and technical measures to ensure increased protection of such data. Automated data processing, as a special procedure, is also reflected in the sources of international and integration law (for example, in Art. 2 of ETS Convention No. 108).

It should be noted that the analysis of the above documents highlights one general rule according to which an automated analysis and decision-making are permitted only with the consent of the subject or due to a "special public interest" (protection of sovereignty, health, etc.) of such processing in relation to situations that may entail legal consequences for a person or have a significant impact on him.

Of particular note is the work of the Expert Group's Ethics Guidelines for Trustworthy Artificial Intelligence under the auspices of the European Commission (hereinafter referred to as the EC Guidelines), which, within the framework of the Guidelines, state that "the recruitment of people with different backgrounds, cultures and specializations […] should be encouraged," and this is included in the context of ensuring fair and unbiased AI (High-Level Expert Group on Artifcial Intelligence 2019).

This context can be scaled up in more detail at the level of UN internal law, since it is difficult to imagine a more optimal, ramified and diverse selection of specialists.

When considering the issue of data circulation, it is necessary to note that the above-mentioned document establishes the need not only to maintain the confidentiality of the documents themselves, but also to detail the list of persons allowed to access them.

Abbott (2020) points out that in terms of complying with these EC guidelines, we are faced with two conflicting approaches. On the one hand, we expect AI to significantly increase the transparency and understandability of the data being interpreted (the results of AI processing). On the other hand, transparency can only be increased if we have access to the data on which decisions are based (analysis of the source databases themselves) (Abbott 2020).

The author of this paper consider that it is necessary to separately note the controversial nature of the provisions related to the protection of personal data of EU countries when using AI technologies in accordance with the EC guidelines in the context of subsequent judicial interpretation, which may modify or significantly supplement the ethical provisions of the recommendations (Wachter Mittelstadt Floridi 2017).

In the context of using AI in recruiting and processing personal data of employees of international organizations, a starting point could be the example of Amazon, which began using AI in recruiting in 2014. However, the results were largely biased towards men - due to unbalanced input (Hill 2019).

This case, in general, like questions of bias in AI technology, will require the development of separate expert departments within an international organization or the involvement of external expertise (Davis 2018).

When considering EU case law in the context of personal data processing, it is also necessary to consider the current case law, which will allow us to understand in a representative manner what blocks the judiciary faces when considering disputes related to the use of AI: Ethnic and gender discrimination at the core of AI algorithms within the framework of European case law has quite interesting examples for the purposes of using AI in the context of the prospective implementation of technology in the internal governance of international organizations. In the Jyske Finans case (EU C-668/15 2017), the plaintiff argued that "persons of "Danish ethnicity" will enjoy more favorable treatment as a result of this practice." In the Maniero case (EU C-457/17 2018), similar arguments were made that an abstract comparison is not a condition for establishing prima facie discrimination; specific circumstances and a concrete comparison are needed.

A more controversial parameter for assessing gender discrimination in percentage equivalent, for the purposes of applying AI, is presented in the cases of Maria Kowalska v Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg (EU C-33/89 1990), Ingrid Rinner-Kühn v FWW Spezial-Gebäudereinigung GmbH & Co. KG (EU Case 171/88 1989), Stadt Lengerich v Angelika Helmig and Waltraud Schmidt v Deutsche Angestellten-Krankenkasse (EU C-78/93 1994). In these cases, the EU Court examined in detail the circumstances of the discriminatory element in terms of establishing part-time work for certain gender groups and noted that the threshold of significant or serious inequality may be lowered if the evidence "reveals a persistent and relatively constant inequality over a long period" (EU C-167/97 1999).

Developing the logic of the court, in the context of statistical and algorithmic assessment of discrimination, including on the basis of analysis of personal data, it should be noted that scientists consider it promising to use this common sense to assess prejudice and discrimination (Tobler 2008; Doyle 2007). This logic lacks statistical data. However, clearly understandable different working conditions were reflected in the EU case law in the Meister case, where the court ruled that "indirect discrimination can be established by any means, and not only on the basis of statistical data (EU C-415/10 2017). "

4.2.3. Implementation of the Rights of International Employees in the Context of AI Development from the Standpoint of Human Rights: The Right to Health as an Example

The origins of the international legal discourse on the role and place of AI in the system of legal relations with humans were outlined at a conference in 1956 by McCarthy, J., Minsky, M. L., Rochester, N., Shannon, C. E (McCarthy et al. 2006), who provided at the definitional level the concept of AI science as a science and engineering activity aimed at creating intelligent machines. The analysis of documents in the diachronic paradigm determines the need to take into account the results of the 1968 International Conference on Human Rights in Tehran as an administrative and legal basis for regulating technologies to ensure compliance with human rights. Following the conference, a document was adopted that examines the issues of the relationship between science and technology in the context of human rights, and also separately states that scientific and technological advances not only open up vast prospects for socio-economic and cultural progress, but also threaten the exercise of rights and freedoms of individuals and will require continuing attention "While recent scientific discoveries and technological advances have opened vast prospects for economic, social and cultural progress, such developments may nevertheless endanger the rights and freedoms of individuals and will require continuing attention"; (Part II, par 18, p.5) (UN CONF.32/41 1968).

Subsequently, the UN General Assembly adopted the Resolution "Human Rights and Scientific and Technological Progress" (UN Tehran 1968), which drew attention to the fact that discoveries themselves cannot be positive or negative, since the main factor is the way they are used.

It should be noted that, taking into account technological development, especially in the field of biotechnology and new medical IT technologies, relevant acts have been adopted (WHA 2007; UN 1997; CETS №203 2008).

The main principles for using AI to ensure health, including for employees of international organizations, can be formulated based on the following documents:

- Respect for human rights, fundamental freedoms and dignity, including the right to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health (Preamble to the WHO Constitution (WHO 1946), paragraph 1 of Article 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (UN Pact 1966), the UN Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights (UN Universal Declaration, 1997));
- Transition to universal coverage of health services (subparagraph "d" of paragraph 2 of Article 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Article II of the Alma-Ata Declaration (UN Alma-Ata Declaration 1978);
- Ensuring the safety of intervention in the sphere of human health (Articles 3, 5 and 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UN UDHR 1948), Articles 2, 7 and 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, preambles of the UN Charter (UN Charter 1945) and the WHO Constitution).

In the context of specialized documents regulating the activities of UN employees, it is necessary to pay attention to the "Staff Regulations and Rules of the United Nations, including the Provisional Staff Rules of the United Nations" (UN ST/SGB/2023/1 2023). Within the framework of this document, there is an extensive list of rules and requirements for UN employees; in the context of the implementation of the right to health for international employees, a number of rules are established, including:

- Rule 3.8. establishes a language allowance (taken into account when establishing the amount of contributions to the United Nations Joint Staff Pension Fund, the medical and group insurance system ...)
- Rule 4.19 establishes the obligation for UN employees to undergo a medical examination
- Rule 6.2. establishes the procedure for granting an employee sick leave;
- Rule 6.6. establishes the procedure for employees' participation in medical insurance.

In the context of the medical services department and its competencies, it is necessary to note the consolidation of powers in Article 1.7. At the same time, within the framework of the document under consideration, the procedure for the use of algorithmic (partially and fully autonomous AI modules) in the activities of both UN employees and in the processing of their data for medical research is not affected. The only emphasis is placed on the issue of the availability of rights to the results of intellectual activity, as enshrined in rules 1.9.

This thesis is also reflected in the analysis of the implementation of health insurance, in ensuring the right of employees of international organizations to health and medical services, in the report of the UN Joint Inspection Unit (UN JIU/REP/2007/2 2007), which contains a global analysis of the costs of providing health insurance to employees.

This document contains a general analysis of costs and the need for unification of approaches to providing medical insurance. At the same time, the issues of determining the role and place of algorithmic systems in the medical examination of UN employees remain open.

As part of the presented analysis, it is proposed to consider the issues of implementing the right to health of employees of international organizations through the prism of the functioning of AI based on the stated principles at the international level:

- The principle of transparency of AI algorithms (paragraph 40 of the 2021 UNESCO Recommendation on the Ethical Aspects of Artificial Intelligence, paragraph 1.3 and subparagraph "b" of paragraph 1.4 of the OECD Council Recommendation on AI of 22.05.2019, Annexes to the EU Resolution (European Commission 2017) that aims at ensuring the explainability of AI and is implemented in three areas: organizational (access to information, control in decision-making), technical (access to the source code of AI) and substantive (completeness, reliability and availability of information about the algorithm);
- Risk management principle (paragraphs 25, 53, 64 and 133 of the 2021 UNESCO Recommendation on the Ethical Aspects of AI, paragraphs 10, 23, 53 of the EU Resolution) includes the assessment of security risks through monitoring threats of harm to basic human values; assessment of risks to the security of AI systems and risk minimization;
- Principle of safe use that assumes the protection of life, health, property and human rights and ensuring the security of AI (paragraph 27 of the 2021 UNESCO Recommendation on the Ethical Aspects of AI, paragraph 1.4 of the 2019 OECD Recommendation on AI).

Considering the technological aspect of the use of AI in the medical field, one cannot fail to note the increasing role of diagnostic and predictive services similar to IBM Watson (IBM Watson n/d), AI Laura (AI Laura n/d.), etc.

In the context of ethical and legal issues, it is essential to acknowledge the problem identified by the team of researcher (Wahl et al., 2018) for the purposes of the present article, namely the principles of uneven data exchange and the procedure for maintaining their confidentiality, especially when using AI technology. It should be noted that in different countries the issue of using AI in the medical field from the standpoint of closedness and openness of the data used varies, which may subsequently cause difficulties in maintaining confidentiality.

We share this concern, especially in the context of the implementation of the right to health for international employees, since

in the current versions of the rules this issue is not yet regulated and may in the future become a matter for taking appropriate action.

The context of technological, legal, and economic unevenness in the use of AI in the medical field is also actively studied by various researchers, in the context of different country groups (Solano-Kamaiko et al. 2024; Serbaya et al 2024). In the same logic, a separate solution will be required to assess the qualifications of the assistance provided to medical personnel, the role of the medical organization and the AI developer company in the implementation of the right to health of employees (Panch et al. 2018; Tam et al. 2023).

5. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The present research aimed to determine the prospects for the development of the internal law of international organizations taking into account the global implementation of AI technology for the Good and Sustainable Development.

To achieve this goal, the authors have combined theoretical and empirical studies that have specified the role of internal law of international organizations in the international law framework for AI global development, identified current trends and prospects for regulating AI technology at the level of international organizations, and provided some interpretations and comments in the course of discussion and empirical data interpretation. The findings yield preliminary recommendations and suggestions that the authors deem appropriate to set forth.

We have previously noted that the absence of any unification of the legal procedure for the application of the internal law of international organizations creates a certain difficulty in formulating unified comprehensive approaches to the implementation of AI technology, which is why the focus of the study is mainly formulated on the basis of internal UN documents and a number of EU documents.

As part of the analysis introduce in the article, we have found that the harmonization of requirements for the provision of medical services using AI at the level of international, domestic international and national regulation requires more detailed articulation in a separate document, taking into account the elimination of technological, legal, and economic unevenness.

Firstly, in the context of the development of the internal law of international organizations and intergovernmental organizations, it is necessary to detail and unify the concept of tort liability. In particular, with regard to the boundaries of liability of the international organization itself and its representatives (international employees).

Secondly, since the UN documents define the need to distinguish between positions related to control and development and developers of AI systems, the authors of this article propose to make the labeling of participants in the process of operating AI systems more detailed by analogy with the term actors presented in the Code of Ethics in the field of AI (AI Code of Ethics 2021):

- Developers creating, training, testing AI models/systems and developing, implementing such models/systems, software and/or hardware systems and
- Developers assuming responsibility for their design;
- Customers (person or organization) receiving a product or service;
- Data suppliers and persons generating data sets for their use in AI;
- Experts measuring and/or evaluating the parameters of developed models/systems;
- Manufacturers engaged in the production of SII;
- Operators of artificial intelligence systems who legally own the relevant systems, use them for their intended purpose and directly implement solutions to applied problems using artificial intelligence systems;
- Operators (person or organization) who operate artificial intelligence systems;
- Persons involved in regulatory impact on the AI sphere, including developers of normative and technical documents, guidelines, various regulatory provisions, requirements and standards in the field of AI;
- Other persons whose actions may potentially affect the results of actions of artificial intelligence systems or persons making decisions using artificial intelligence systems.

This distribution will be more precise for the subsequent determination of the responsibility of persons for the illegal use of AI technology.

Thirdly, in the context of the potential allocation of a separate legal capacity for AI technology by analogy with an electronic person, it will require the development of an additional conceptual apparatus and boundaries of legal capacity, including the classical issues of legal, deed, and tort capacity, even if a legal fiction is used by analogy with a legal entity.

Fourthly, in the context of fundamental issues of control and risk management in the use of AI technology in the domestic law of international organizations, one of the ways to potentially eliminate issues of bias embedded at the level of datasets and their processing is to develop a percentage parametric level, which is to some extent disclosed in the EU case law and a number of scholars who formulate legal qualitative and quantitative boundaries for the purposes of exploiting AI.

Fifthly, considering the issue of law enforcement and judicial practice, it is essential to acknowledge the positive steps taken by the High-level Committee on Management Chief Executives Board for Coordination of the United Nations, which prepared a Report on the Operational Use of AI in the UN System, where a detailed analysis of the effectiveness (from the point of view of the social and economic component) of the use of AI in specific cases is carried out. A possible additional step to reduce concerns related to the use of AI technology could be the creation of an international interactive platform or portal, which will disclose information in detail (within the limits permitted by law), similar to the portals of the OECD (in the context of a general dashboard) (OECD AI, n/d), the EU (in the context of the subject composition and effectiveness of the use of AI) (EU AI, n/d), as well as judicial practice at the level of national states (in the context of harmonizing general judicial practice regarding AI)(DAIL, n/d.).

Finally, the issue of harmonizing requirements for the provision of medical services using AI at the level of supranational and national regulation is open. It will be necessary to detail the conditions for the use of AI and harmonize them taking into account the elimination of technological, legal, and economic unevenness. It seems promising to develop in the system of internal law of international organizations permissible and unacceptable areas of application of AI technologies and to consolidate them in a separate document for internal use.

A separate issue concerns the circulation of personal data in the context of medical services and their processing by AI; this issue requires further detailed consideration, as do issues of liability when using AI.

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